![]() We also use the multiple-infrastructure and multiple-urban-area data sets to demonstrate the model results. Moreover, the defender’s total marginal effects can be decomposed into direct and indirect effects. At the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, the defender’s total marginal effects are the same among targets. The equilibrium solutions are provided using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions. We study how the defender’s and the attacker’s equilibrium allocations depend on the budget constraints, target valuations, cost effectiveness of their investments, and inherent defense levels of targets in both sequential-move and simultaneous-move games. In this paper, a game-theoretical model is proposed to study both the defender’s (government) and the attacker’s (terrorist) expenditures among multiple targets under budget constraints to guide investment in defense. Though the choices of terrorists’ attack targets are vast, their resources are limited.
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